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Abstract 
Previous research suggests that there are substantial interactions between the unem-
ployment insurance (UI) and the sickness insurance (SI) in Sweden. Moral hazard arises 
in the interplay between these two social insurance systems, since by reporting sick an 
unemployed person can postpone the UI expiration date and sometimes also receive 
considerably higher benefits. This paper examines whether these interactions affect the 
transition rate from unemployment to employment. To study this question I utilize a 
reform which greatly reduced the incentives for unemployed persons to transfer to the 
SI. While there is evidence that this reform substantially lowered the incidence of sick 
reports among the unemployed, I find no evidence suggesting that the reduced sick re-
port rate in turn affected the transition rate to employment. 
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2  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? 1 Introduction 
In recent years, several academics as well as policy makers have pointed out that 
undesired incentive effects arising from the interplay between different social insurance 
programs within a welfare state may be an overlooked and financially costly pheno-
menon (see e.g. Krueger and Meyer 2002, and the European Economic Advisory 
Group, 2007). Many countries have complex social insurance systems and their various 
parts sometimes overlap in ways that can generate unintended flows between them. This 
has, for instance, been noted with regard to unemployment (UI) and sickness insurance 
(SI) in Sweden and Norway (see e.g. Larsson 2006, and Henningsen 2006), UI and 
disability pensions in Sweden and Finland (see e.g. Karlström et al 2006, and OECD 
2006), and UI and workers’ compensations programs in Canada (see e.g. Fortin and 
Lanoie 1992). In the presence of such interactions, limiting access to one program may 
just result in an overflow to other programs. Reforms intended to increase transitions to 
employment by a change of a single program may then not be very effective. For 
example, reducing the amount or the duration of UI benefits may not be an efficient way 
of inducing the unemployed to search harder for jobs if they can easily shift to other 
benefit programs. 
While there is evidence that the interplay between different social insurance pro-
grams sometimes does give rise to benefit arbitrage (see e.g. Larsson 2006, and Larsson 
and Runeson 2007), little research has been done on whether such interactions actually 
matter for transitions to employment. Pellizzari (2006), who studies interactions 
between UI and social assistance in 15 EU countries, is an exception. His findings 
suggest that UI recipients who are also eligible for social assistance are less sensitive to 
changes in the level and the duration of their UI benefits, and that the interplay between 
these programs may provide an explanation for the scant success of many labor market 
reforms in Europe in the past decades. In this paper, I provide Swedish evidence on the 
interplay between UI and another type of social insurance program, namely the SI, and 
on whether this interplay affects transitions to employment. 
In Sweden, unemployed individuals are able to report sick and receive SI benefits. 
The rationale behind this rule is that job search is comparable to work. In order to be 
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  3 eligible for UI, an unemployed person should actively search for jobs and be able to 
accept employment at short notice. A person who looses his or her work (search) 
capacity due to sickness should therefore be funded by the SI rather than the UI. 
Previous research on the interplay between these two insurances, however, suggests that 
health deterioration is not the sole explanatory factor for transitions to the SI. The pro-
bability of transferring to the SI is affected by the relative compensation in the two 
systems; unemployed persons are more likely to report sick if their replacement rate is 
higher in the SI than in the UI (Larsson and Runeson 2007). The probability of 
reporting sick is also found to increase drastically as the UI expiration date approaches, 
suggesting that the SI may be used as a way of postponing the UI expiration date 
(though it cannot be excluded that the peak is at least partly driven by health deteriora-
tion due to stress) (Larsson 2006, and SFU 2007). 
If transitions to employment would follow a similar trajectory regardless of shifting 
to the SI or remaining in the UI system, this type of interplay should perhaps not cause 
too much concern. Of course, government spending increases if the SI benefits are 
higher than the individual’s alternative benefits, but the costs would be much larger if 
these UI-SI interactions in general also worked to prolong the individuals’ time out of 
employment. 
There are in fact several reasons for why the source of funding (UI or SI) may matter 
for the incentives to find work. Being on UI is associated with a number of rules, the 
purpose of which is to increase transitions to employment: the worker is obliged to 
apply for and accept jobs, otherwise a sanction may be imposed
1; benefits are reduced 
after 100 benefit days
2; and there is a formal time limit on how long benefits can be re-
ceived
3. SI benefits, on the other hand, are not associated with any similar requirements 
                                                 
1 Some recent empirical studies from the Netherlands and Switzerland suggest that imposing sanctions in the UI 
substantially raises the exit rate from unemployment, see e.g. Abbring et al (2005) and Lalive et al (2005). 
2 The question of how the UI benefit level affects job finding has received extensive attention in the economic 
literature. A recent survey of the evidence is provided by Krueger and Meyer (2002). The US studies surveyed imply 
an elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to the UI benefit level in excess of 0.5. The results from other 
countries are more varied. Carling et al (2001) suggest an elasticity of 1.6 for Sweden. 
3 Several empirical studies find that the transition rate from unemployment to employment increases as the UI 
expiration date approaches. See e.g. Moffitt (1985), Meyer (1990), and Katz and Meyer (1990) for evidence from the 
US. Swedish evidence is reported by Carling et al (1996). 
4  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? and have in principle unlimited duration.
4 Hence, if the UI rules work as intended, 
funding from the UI rather than the SI could (for a given health status) be expected to be 
associated with a higher search effort. 
In order to study whether transitions to SI among the unemployed affect the tran-
sition rate to employment, I use a reform in July 2003 which changed the relative 
compensation in the two systems. The reform reduced the SI benefit cap (i.e. the 
maximum amount) so as to correspond to the UI benefit cap, in order to prevent 
unemployed workers from receiving higher benefits by reporting sick. Before the 
reform, SI benefits could exceed UI benefits by up to 20 percent. Larsson and Runeson 
(2007) find that this policy change led to a large (36 percent) decline in the sick report 
rate among the unemployed affected by the reform. The question of interest here is 
whether the reduced sick report rate in turn translated into a higher rate of job finding. 
To identify the effect of the reduced SI benefits (relative to the UI benefits) on the 
transition rate to employment, I use the fact that the reform affected various groups of 
unemployed persons differently and at different durations of unemployment. First, as 
workers became unemployed at different dates, the reform affected them at different 
lengths into their unemployment period. This variation can be used to separate the 
reform effect from the effect of unemployment duration. I do this by comparing the 
hazard to employment for people who experienced the reform at different stages of their 
unemployment period. Second, only those with previous wages above the UI benefit 
cap were affected by the reform. The change in transitions to employment for those with 
previously lower wages can thus be used to control for calendar time effects (such as 
business cycle effects) around the time of the reform, which were common to the two 
groups.
5 
My results suggest that, while the reform significantly reduced sickness absence 
among the unemployed, this did not matter for the transition rate to employment. For 
those who reduced their sick report rate due to the reform, spending more time in the UI  
                                                 
4 These were the rules in place during the time period for which I have data in this paper. 
5 Larsson and Runeson (2007) use a similar identification strategy.  
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robust across various sensitivity tests. Hence, while there are important interactions 
between these two social insurance systems, I find no evidence suggesting that these 
interactions affect the job finding rate among the unemployed workers. 
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 I describe the central 
features of Sweden’s UI and SI systems, as well as the SI reform in July 2003. Section 3 
discusses theoretical issues. The empirical strategy is described in Section 4, and 
Section 5 presents the data. The results as well as a number of sensitivity checks are 
shown in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 contains concluding remarks. 
2  Unemployment and sickness insurance in 
Sweden
6 
The UI and SI constitute essential parts of the public social insurance system in Sweden. 
Their purpose is to insure against income losses due to involuntary unemployment (the 
UI) and sickness (the SI). Both insurances provide income-related compensation up to a 
cap and the benefits are for the most part financed by taxes. 
2.1  Description of the unemployment insurance 
The UI consists of two parts: a basic insurance offering a fixed amount of compen-
sation and a voluntary income-loss insurance providing income-related benefits. In 
order to be eligible for any kind of UI benefits, an unemployed person must be 
registered at the public employment service (PES) as a ‘job seeker’ and be willing to 
accept employment. Qualification for income-related benefits additionally requires that 
the person has been a member of a UI fund for at least twelve months prior to 
unemployment (the membership condition) and that he or she has worked during at least 
six of these months (the working condition). If the person fulfills the working condition 
but not the membership condition, he or she is entitled to the fixed basic amount of 
compensation.
7 
                                                 
6 This section describes the rules in place during 2003. 
7 For a detailed description of the UI see e.g. www.aea.se. 
6  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? The UI is administered by a number UI funds that together enroll about 85 percent of 
the work force. The PES controls that the unemployed fulfill the rules concerning job 
search. To receive UI benefits, an unemployed person has to meet his or her caseworker 
at the PES regularly and apply for any job the caseworker assigns him or her. If the 
person does not meet these requirements, he or she can be submitted to a sanction in the 
form of reduced or suspended benefits. The sanctions can be time-limited or permanent, 
depending on if the person has broken the rules before, and on the expected length of 
the job he or she refuses to accept.
8 
In 2003, when the reform was implemented, the UI benefits were time-limited to 300 
workdays (60 weeks) and could be received either continuously or with breaks in the 
unemployment period. For individuals reaching the end of their benefit period, a PES 
caseworker would assess the need for intensified counseling. If such a need was found, 
the person would get assigned to a specific labor market program
9. Refusing to parti-
cipate would lead to benefit expiration. If intensified counseling was not found 
necessary, the unemployed would get entitled to a new benefit period of 300 days. Such 
an extension was however only possible once. 
The UI replaced 80 percent of the worker’s average earnings during the last six 
month of employment, with a lower and an upper limit. See Figure 1 for an illustration. 
The lower limit was SEK 7,040 (≈ € 760)
10  per month and equaled the fixed basic 
amount. The maximum amount varied depending on how long the person had been un-
employed. During the first 100 benefit days, the cap was 80 percent of a monthly wage 
of SEK 20,075 and after that the cap dropped to 80 percent of SEK 18,700. No com-
pensation was given during the first five days of an unemployment period.
11 
                                                 
8 An unemployed person does not necessarily have to accept any job in order to receive further UI benefits. Factors 
such as the family situation and the duration of unemployment are taken into account in the judgement. 
9 The program was called Activity Guarantee and implied full time activity. Participants were offered counselling and 
the whole spectrum of programs and services available at the PES. The economic compensation equaled the UI 
benefits. 
10 Exchange rate May, 2007. 
11 If the unemployment was voluntary, that is if the person had quit his or her job without a valid reason, the 
uncompensated period was up to 45 benefit days. For those who had been laid off because of improper behaviour, the 
suspension period could be even longer.   
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  7 Monthly benefits (SEK) 
16,060   Day 1-100 
14,960   Day 101-300 
7,040 
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Figure 1 UI benefits in 2003 
2.2  Description of the sickness insurance 
The SI provides economic compensation when a worker is too sick to carry out his or 
her regular job. All employed workers are automatically covered by the insurance. Un-
employed workers who have previously been employed are also eligible, as long as they 
are registered as ‘job seekers’ at the PES. The size of the SI benefits depends on the 
person’s wage prior to the sick period. For unemployed workers however, the benefits 
are based on the wage prior to unemployment. 
The Social Insurance Agency is responsible for the SI compensation for unemployed 
workers. The first day of a sickness period is always uncompensated. During the first 
seven days it is up to the individual to judge whether he or she is too sick to work 
(search). Thereafter, the person needs a certificate from a doctor in order to receive 
additional benefits. In 2003, there was no formal time-limit for how long SI benefits 
could be received. 
In the beginning of 2003, the SI replacement rate was 80 percent of the previous 
(pre-unemployment) wage. Hence, the replacement rate was the same as in the income-
related UI.
12 The minimum wage for receiving any SI benefits at all was SEK 775 per 
month, and the maximum SEK 24,125 per month. In other words, SI benefits varied 
                                                 
12 However, the two insurance systems define the earnings on which the benefits are based somewhat differently. 
While the UI benefits are based on the worker’s average earnings during the last six months of employment, the SI 
benefits are based on an estimate of the earnings a worker would have had during the sickness period. 
8  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? between SEK 620 and SEK 19,300 per month.
13 This meant that the maximum monthly 
SI benefits exceeded the maximum monthly UI benefits. The reform on 1 July 2003 
changed the marginal replacement rate in the SI in two ways. Figure 2 illustrates how 
the changes affected unemployed workers. First, the reform reduced the marginal 
replacement rate to 77.6 percent. This change concerned all insured, employed as well 
as unemployed. Second, for the unemployed insured, the maximum SI benefits were 
reduced to SEK 16,060 per month, which corresponded to the maximum monthly UI 
benefits. The purpose of the latter part of the reform was to prevent unemployed persons 
from receiving higher benefits by reporting sick. 
Before the reform  After the reform 
Monthly benefits (SEK)  Monthly benefits (SEK) 
19,300 
 
Figure 2 SI benefits for unemployed workers, before and after the reform in July, 
2003 
An additional aspect of the second part of the reform, which is important for this 
study, is that it affected all unemployed insured, i.e. even those with already ongoing UI 
spells had their SI benefits reduced on 1 July 2003. This feature turns out to be im-
portant for the identification strategy (see Section 4). 
                                                 
13 The numbers in this section do not account for the first uncompensated day in a sickness period. 





775  24,125  775  20,696 
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Sickness absence and unemployment, though two states both representing substantial 
losses of work time, are typically not analyzed jointly. Sickness absence has most 
commonly been analyzed within the framework of a labor supply model, and the focus 
has generally been exclusively on employed workers (see Brown and Sessions 1996, for 
a survey of the work absence literature). Holmlund (2005) develops a theoretical 
framework that incorporates both unemployment and sickness absence as distinct labor 
force states. Moreover, sickness absence may occur both among employed and among 
unemployed workers. This model thus allows for interdependencies between policies 
concerning unemployment and sickness absence and is suitable for a unified analysis of 
labor market effects of changes in sickness and unemployment benefits.
14 
The Holmlund (2005) model includes four different labor force states: work, sickness 
absence, unemployment and non-participation. Individuals in the first two states are 
employed, whereas those in the second two states are non-employed. Sickness absence 
among unemployed workers is regarded as non-participation. Contrary to the state of 
unemployment, individuals in this state do not search for jobs actively, and hence the 
probability of finding employment is lower (though it is still positive since the 
individuals may be contacted by an employer). 
Each of the four labor force states is associated with a particular present discounted 
value of utility. This value depends on the income in the current state as well as on 
incomes in all other potential states, since chance and choice induce the (homogenous) 
workers to move between states. Employed workers face a risk of job loss and non-
employed workers face a chance of finding a job. Workers are also exposed to random 
(daily) shocks of sickness, which affect their disutility of work and job search. The key 
decision for employed individuals is to choose between work and sickness absence, and 
for the non-employed, to choose between search and inactivity, i.e. between unemploy-
ment and non-participation. 
                                                 
14 This model ignores the behavior of firms and focuses on the supply side. See Engström and Holmlund (2007) for 
an extension of the model that also incorporates firm behavior.  
10  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? The optimal behavior is characterized by reservation values of sickness. The employed 
prefer sickness absence rather than work for sufficiently severe sickness shocks; and 
similarly, the non-employed prefer non-participation rather than job search for 
sufficiently serious realizations of sickness. The critical values of sickness generally 
differ between employed and non-employed workers, and are determined by benefits 
and other parameters of the model. For example, the reservation value of sickness is 
higher, the higher is the relative economic gain of being active rather than inactive. 
Hence, for non-employed workers, the probability of reporting sick is lower, the lower 
are SI benefits relative to UI benefits. The reservation level of sickness also depends on 
differences in transition probabilities; e.g., the higher the relative returns to active job 
search, the lower the probability that non-employed workers report sick. 
A decrease in SI benefits targeting only non-employed workers, such as the one in 
Sweden in July 2003, has straightforward implications in this framework. First, reduced 
SI benefits for non-employed individuals will have a direct positive effect on their 
reservation level of sickness, making non-employed individuals less inclined to report 
sick. There will also be a wealth effect working in the same direction since the value of 
non-employment decreases relative to the value of employment, which makes active job 
search more attractive.
15 Second, since the probability of finding a job is higher in 
unemployment than in non-participation by assumption, the higher reservation level of 
sickness will also translate into a higher job finding rate among the non-employed 
workers. 
4 Identification  strategy 
The question of interest in this paper is whether the reform in July 2003 affected the 
transition rate to employment, through its effect on the sick report rate. To identify the 
effect of the reduced SI benefits (relative to the UI benefits), I exploit two features of 
the reform: (i) As workers became unemployed at different dates, the reform affected 
them at different durations of unemployment. By exploiting this variation, one can 
                                                 
15 If the risk of job loss is higher for workers on sick leave than for those at work, the reservation level of sickness 
will also increase for employed workers, since the incentives to prevent a job loss by attending work increases.  
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with previous wages above the UI benefit cap were affected by the reform. The change 
in transitions to employment for those with previously lower wages can thus be used to 
control for calendar time effects (such as business cycle effects) around the time of the 
reform, which were common to the two groups. 
I begin by describing more closely how the reform affected the difference between 
UI and SI benefits for various types of unemployed persons.
16 Recall that the difference 
depended on: (i) the wage prior to unemployment, and (ii) whether the person had 
received UI benefits for less or more than 100 days. Figure 3 shows the case of an 
unemployed person who has not yet passed the 100-day limit in the UI, i.e. before the 
UI benefit cap drops. 
Day 1-100 on UI benefits 
Before the reform  After the reform 
Benefits    Benefits   Pre-reform SI
 SI 
 
Figure 3 The change in SI benefits due to the reform, during the first 100 UI benefit 
days 
 
                                                 
16 The following paragraphs in this section build extensively on the description in Section 3 in Larsson and Runeson 
(2007).   
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12  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? The reform lowered the SI benefits for everybody, as the marginal replacement rate was 
reduced from 80 to 77.6 percent. Thus, SI benefits were reduced relative to UI benefits 
for all unemployed persons. However, up to the previous wage of SEK 20,696 the 
reduction in SI benefits was relatively small; amounting to only 3 percent.
17 I will refer 
to this group as the comparison group. For unemployed persons with a previous wage 
above that cut-off, the treated, the reform implied a reduction of the SI benefits that 
varied from 3 up to almost 17 percent. 
The situation is somewhat different for the unemployed who have passed the first 
100 UI benefit days, as the cap in the UI then is lower. This implies that even after the 
reform, SI benefits are higher than UI benefits for high-wage unemployed persons. 
However, the effect of the reform on the difference in SI benefits is similar to Figure 3: 
up to a previous wage of SEK 20,696 the SI benefits were reduced by 3 percent. From 
that level upwards, the reduction was larger the higher the previous wage, varying 
between 3 and almost 17 percent. So again, the population can be divided into treated 
and comparisons according to the previous wage, the cut-off being at SEK 20,696. 
I will analyze the effect of the change in SI compensation on the hazard rate to 
employment, that is, the rate at which a person finds a job at time t of unemployment, 
conditional on remaining unemployed up until this point in time. In addition to making 
use of the treatment and comparison group, the identification strategy used exploits the 
timing of the reform. The timing feature arises when one uses duration data and has a 
fixed reform date. As workers be-come unemployed at different dates, the reform af-
fects them at different durations of unemployment. This variation can be used to sepa-
rate the reform effect from the effect of unemployment duration. I do this by comparing 
the hazard to employment for people who experienced the reform at different stages of 
their unemployment period. For example, the unemployed who experienced the reform 
8 weeks into their unemployment spell are compared with those whose unemployment 
spells are at least 8 weeks, but who did not experience the reform until after week 8 or 
never. 
                                                 
 
17 Persons with very low previous earnings are an exception, as the reform also implied a marginal reduction of the 
minimum wage for SI eligibility; from SEK 620 to SEK 601. Hence, persons in this income group became eligible 
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likely that other changes on the labor market occurred around the time of the reform 
which also affected transitions to employment. In order to separate the effect of the 
reduced SI benefits from such factors, I compare the reform-date effect for the treatment 
and the comparison group. A larger effect for the treated, who experienced a larger 
benefit cut, will indicate responsiveness to the SI compensation size. The policy change 
which is used to identify the behavioral response to the SI benefit level is thus not the 
entire reduction in SI benefits due to the reform, but rather the reduction over and above 
the general 3 percent reduction in the replacement rate. The effect of the 3 percent re-
duction cannot be separated from the effects of other changes around the time of the 
reform. 
To estimate the effect of the policy change, I use a Cox regression model. The 
baseline specification to be estimated can be written as: 
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where  λ0 is the baseline hazard, i.e. the pre-reform hazard to employment. f(.) is a 
function of time-invariant covariates, x, and time-varying covariates, z(t), and Ω is a 
vector of parameters corresponding to the covariates.
18   is a time-varying dummy 
variable, where 0 prior to the reform and 1 thereafter.   is a 
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T D 0 if the previous wage is below SEK 
20,696 and  1 for wages above that. The effect of the reduction in the SI benefit 
cap is obtained by comparing the change in hazard rates for the treated and the 
comparisons after the reform. The effect of the policy change is given by the coefficient 
of the interaction variable, β. 

T D
                                                                                                                                               
for SI and thus experienced a benefit increase. However, there are no observations in this income interval in the 
sample studied in this paper.    
18 The covariates included are sex, age, age
2, immigrant background, marital status, presence of children younger than 
18, level of education (4 categories), type of education (10 categories), ln(pre-unemployment wage), number of days 
left until UI benefit expiration (6 categories), and indicators of the local labor market (county) as well as the month of 
entry into unemployment.   
14  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? The identifying assumption behind this ‘difference-in-differences’ approach is thus that 
the development over time of the hazard to employment in the comparison group, 
captures the counterfactual development in the treatment group, had the reform not 
occurred. This assumption is violated if, for example, the labor market opportunities 
developed differently for the two groups around the time of the reform. Divergent trends 
at other times during the sampling period may also be problematic as they may lead to 
divergent compositional changes in the two groups regarding unobserved factors.
19 
In order to check whether the estimates are affected by compositional changes in 
unobserved factors, I also estimate stratified models. I use the month of entry into un-
employment as well as the local labor market as stratification units. This specification 
should be less sensitive to unobserved heterogeneity as the reform effect is identified 
solely by comparing individuals beginning their unemployment period during the same 
month and in the same local labor market. To check whether the results could be biased 
due to divergent changes in labor market opportunities for the two groups, I try to assess 
whether such changes have taken place during the relevant time period. I also re-
estimate the model for a few different sub-samples which are more similar than the 
treated and comparisons in the baseline model, in terms of the pre-unemployment wage. 
Finally, to test whether the results may be biased as a result of divergent seasonal 
patterns for the two groups, I analyze the effects of a hypothetical reform supposed to 
have occurred on the same date the year after the actual reform. The results turn out to 
be robust in these respects. 
5  Data and sampling 
5.1 Data 
I combine data from several different sources for the empirical analysis. The database 
ASTAT, originating from the unemployment insurance funds, HÄNDEL, from the PES, 
and the Sickness Benefit Register ( SFR) from the National Social Insurance Board, 
                                                 
19 It is well known that problems with unobserved heterogeneity are particularly important to handle when estimating 
duration models. Contrary to usual regression models, even unobserved heterogeneity which is uncorrelated with the 
included covariates may cause biased coefficients. 
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  15 constitute the main sources. These databases are all a part of LINDA, which is a register-
based longitudinal database that includes about 3 percent of the Swedish population.
20 
LINDA additionally contains several demographic variables collected from e.g. tax re-
gisters. 
ASTAT contains weekly information on UI benefit payments, as well as on the 
number of days left until the benefits run out, for all unemployed persons who have 
received either basic-amount or income-related benefits. It is most common to receive 
income-related benefits; during 2003 only about 9 percent of all benefit days were on 
the basic-amount. For those entitled to income-related benefits, the database also 
includes information on the previous wage. 
I use ASTAT as the data source for unemployment spells, which implies that the 
condition for being defined as unemployed is to receive funding from the UI.
21 Since 
data on the previous wage does not exist for those who are only entitled to the basic-
amount of UI benefits, I exclude this group from the sample. Data on the pre-unemploy-
ment wage is needed in order to determine a person’s SI compensation in case of 
sickness.
22 
SFR contains data on sickness spells for all persons who have been entitled to SI 
benefits. SI benefits can be given on a full or part-time basis, and they can be of a few 
different types: regular benefits for illness, compensation for work related injury, 
rehabilitation benefits, and benefits for preventive care. Regular SI benefits for illness 
are the most common and were paid out during about 89 percent of all SI spells starting 
in 2003. 
I merge ASTAT with SFR in order to track the length of unemployment spells during 
which the individual switches to SI benefits. Hence, sickness spells that occur during a 
UI benefit period (at the latest, start the week after the payments from the UI stops) are 
considered to be a part of the unemployment spell. Naturally, the same spell continues if 
                                                 
20 For a detailed description of LINDA, see Edin and Fredriksson (2000).  
21 This means that participants in labor market programs and individuals who are registered at the PES as 
unemployed, but who are not qualified for UI benefits, are not included in the sample. 
22 Since the income measure on which the SI benefits are actually based only exists for those who have reported sick, 
I use the income measure reported by the UI funds to calculate the individual’s SI compensation in case of sickness. 
Unless the person worked very irregularly before unemployment, the two income measures should be approximately 
equal.  
16  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? the individual later switches back to UI benefits. All types of SI periods are included 
and, for simplicity, I make no distinction between them. 
Neither ASTAT nor SFR contain any information on why the benefits stop, at the 
end of a spell. Therefore, in order to determine whether or not an unemployment period 
ends in employment, I use information from HÄNDEL. HÄNDEL consists of data on 
the individual’s labor market status, e.g. unemployed; employed; or participant in a 
labor market program, and on transitions between such states, for all persons who are 
registered at the PES. Since registration is compulsory in order to receive UI benefits, 
the records should include all UI benefit recipients. 
I use the individual’s registered labor market status the week after the UI (or SI) ben-
efits stop to define whether or not the spell ends in employment. If the worker is still 
registered in a state pertaining to unemployment during this week, I instead use the 
labor market transition closest in time after as the reason for benefit interruption, given 
that the transition occurs within the next four weeks.
23 Both permanent and temporary 
jobs are classified as employment, as long as they cause a break of at least three weeks 
in the UI benefit payments.
24 
5.2  Sampling and descriptive statistics 
I construct the sample by selecting all individuals who began an unemployment period 
with income-related UI benefits during the period 1 December 2002 – 31 December 
2003. The reason for not sampling before December 2002 is that the wage information 
is incomplete before this point in time.
25 An unemployment period is considered to 
begin when a person who has not received UI benefits during the last three weeks, starts 
to receive UI benefits. I require that the unemployment spells begin with funding from 
the UI, i.e. I do not include persons who became unemployed during or directly after a 
sickness period. 
                                                 
23 The reason for allowing this gap is that ASTAT and HÄNDEL do not match perfectly in this aspect. The 
discrepancy is most likely due to that there is no flow of information from the UI funds to the employment agencies 
regarding the individual’s benefit payments or labor market status. The information in HÄNDEL is instead given to 
the employment agency by the individual or his or her employer.  
24 A person is defined as employed if, when the benefits stop, he or she has left the register due to permanent or 
temporary employment (the variable “avaktualiseringsorsak” is equal to 1, 2 or 3), or if he or she is registered as 
temporarily employed or as job changer (the variable “sökandekategori” is equal to 31 or 41). 
25 Before this date, the wage variable is capped for individuals belonging to some of the UI funds. 
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  17 Each unemployment spell that begins during the sampling period is followed during, at 
most, 60 weeks or until the end of 2004. The spell length is measured in weeks. An 
unemployment period ends when there is a break in the UI payments, other than due to 
sickness, which is three weeks or longer. That is, very short intervening employment 
periods or other breaks are treated as part of the unemployment period. If a UI period 
ends for some other reason than employment, e.g. because the person starts an 
education; a labor market program (including subsidized employment programs); or if 
the reason is unknown, the spell is treated as censored. 
Quite a large share of the unemployment spells, almost 15 percent, end for unknown 
reasons; either the PES has registered that they have lost contact with the person, or the 
data contains no reason for the UI benefit interruption
26. It is likely that some of these 
spells end in employment. People who have found a job may not see any reason to 
contact the PES. If the job is short term only, such persons are likely to remain 
registered as unemployed during the subsequent employment period, and hence I do not 
observe any reason for the UI benefit interruption in the data. If the job is long-term, the 
PES will at some point report that they have lost contact with the person.
27 To the 
extent that the fraction of spells ending for unknown reasons that actually end in 
employment differ systematically between unemployment spells that include sickness 
spells and those that do not, this may bias the estimate of the reform effect. To check 
whether the results are sensitive to how these spells are treated, I have re-estimated the 
model treating all spells ending for unknown reasons as ending in employment. As it 
turns out, this does not affect my findings. 
This sampling procedure results in a sample of 19,291 unemployment spells. 
However, almost 12 percent are excluded since the person cannot be found in the HÄN-
DEL registers during the relevant time period, or due to inconsistent information in 
HÄNDEL. I also exclude workers older than 60 and workers with reported work related 
disabilities. Finally, I exclude a few spells where the worker’s previous wage is below 
the limit for SI eligibility. The resulting sample contains 11,022 unemployed persons 
                                                 
26 In most of these cases the person is still registered as full time unemployed in HÄNDEL. 
27 Bring and Carling (2000) have conducted a follow-up study of ‘lost contact’ individuals. They find that almost 50 
percent dropped out due to employment. 
18  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? and 14,935 unemployment spells. About 24 percent of the individuals have multiple 
unemployment spells. 
Table 1 and Table 2 below present descriptive statistics, separately for the treatment 
and the comparison group. Table 1 gives statistics on the duration of the unemployment 
spells as well as on the reason for benefit interruption. We see that the average spell 
length is about two weeks longer for the treated than for the comparisons. This could be 
due to that it is more common among those in the comparison group to have breaks of a 
few weeks in their unemployment periods. Recall that an unemployment spell – as 
defined here – ends if there is a break in the benefit payments that is three weeks or 
longer. Since repeated unemployment is more common among the comparisons, this 
group in general has fewer days left until their UI benefits expire in the beginning of 
their unemployment spells. The proportion of spells ending in employment also differs 
between the groups; while 35 percent end in employment for the treated, this share is 
only 21 percent for the comparisons. Compared to previous Swedish studies on 
unemployment duration, these shares appear low; e.g. in Carling et al (2001) the 
proportion of spells ending in employment is nearly 47 percent. There are a couple of 
reasons for why this share is much lower in my sample: I censor spells at an earlier du-
ration of unemployment; the proportion of spells ending for unknown reasons (which 
could be employment) is much higher; and I am more likely to observe breaks in the un-
employment spells in my data, compared to in the data used in previous studies.
28 
The most common reason for benefit interruption in the comparison group is ‘other 
destinations’; 42 percent of the spells end in this category, compared to 22 percent 
among the treated. Other destinations include e.g. education and part time unemploy-
ment (without UI benefits). Among these, the latter is the most common destination in 
the comparison group. 
                                                 
28 Most previous Swedish studies have used HÄNDEL to measure unemployment duration. This data is less 
appropriate here, since there is no consistent way of handling individuals who transfer to SI benefits in this register. 
Short sickness spells are likely to be unnoticed in HÄNDEL, whereas a person who gets SI benefits for a longer time 
period either leaves the register at some point during the sickness period, or is moved to the category ‘others 
registered’. The PES generally has less frequent contact with individuals in this category, which means that the infor-
mation on unemployment duration is likely to be less accurate also for these individuals. 
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  Treatment group  Comparison group 
Number of unemployment spells  3 368  11 567 
Number of individuals  2 696  8 408 
Proportion of ind. with multiple 
spells 
0.19 0.25 
Days left until UI benefit expiration  
(in the beginning of the spell) 
224 202 
  
    
Proportion of spells lasting longer 
than 
  
     10 weeks  0.67  0.61 
     20 weeks  0.44  0.40 
     30 weeks  0.31  0.28 
     40 weeks  0.22  0.21 
     50 weeks  0.16  0.14 
Average spell length (weeks)  23.7  21.8 
    
Proportion of spells ending in     
Employment 0.35  0.21 
Labor market programs  0.13  0.13 
Other destinations
♦ 0.22  0.42 
Unknown destination  0.19  0.14 
Censored after 60 weeks or due 
to end of study 
0.11 0.10 
Note: The sample consists of the individuals in the LINDA-database who began an unemployment period with 
income-related UI benefits during the period 2002-12-01 – 2003-12-31. 
♦Other destinations include e.g. education 
and part time unemployment (without UI benefits). 
 
From Table 2 which presents descriptive covariate statistics, we can see that the un-
employed in the comparison group, on average, are younger, less educated, and have 
more young children compared to the treated. The proportion of women is also higher in 
this group, as is the proportion of immigrants from non-OECD countries. There are also 
some differences in type of education between the two groups. The differences in 
observed characteristics are a natural consequence of having defined treatment status 
based on the pre-unemployment wage. 
20  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? Table 2 Sample characteristics (means) 
  Treatment group  Comparison group 
Female 0.28  0.61 
Age 38.8  35.0 
Immigrant: OECD  0.05  0.04 
Immigrant: other  0.06  0.13 
Married 0.46  0.44 
Presence of children<18  0.38  0.46 
Length of education     
     Upper secondary education  0.87  0.85 
     Post-secondary education  0.34  0.21 
     Missing  0.00  0.00 
Type of education     
     General  0.20  0.29 
     Pedagogic, teacher education  0.03  0.05 
     Humanities, arts  0.04  0.06 
     Social sciences, law, trade, admin.  0.17  0.16 
     Science, mathematics, computer science  0.04  0.02 
     Technical, manufacturing  0.38  0.17 
     Agriculture, forestry, veterinary  0.02  0.02 
     Health care, social work  0.04  0.12 
     Service  0.04  0.08 
     Missing/unknown  0.03  0.04 
Pre-unemployment wage (month), SEK*  25 552  15 968 
Number of individuals  2 696  8 408 
Note: The sample consists of the individuals in the LINDA-database who began an unemployment period with 
income-related UI benefits during the period 2002-12-01 – 2003-12-31. * denotes average among spells, rather than 
among individuals. 
 
Figure 4 below shows how the flow from UI to SI benefits evolves over time for the 
sample of unemployed workers. Figure 5 shows the evolution of the share of the 
unemployed finding employment. The shares in both figures are calculated for time 
intervals of two weeks, and separately for the treatment and the comparison group. 
Here, we see a first indication of how the reform affected sickness absence and job 
finding among unemployed workers. The sick report rate is higher for the comparison 
group for most of the time period. Around the time of the reform it decreases for both 
groups, a pattern which is in line with a common finding in the Swedish literature on 
sickness insurance, namely that sick report rates tend to decline in the summer (see e.g. 
Larsson 2006, and Johansson and Palme 2005). After the summer, the flow to SI bene-
fits returns almost to the pre-reform level for the comparisons group, while it remains 
on a somewhat lower level for the treated. This pattern is thus consistent with the 
reform having a negative effect on sickness absence among those unemployed who 
were affected by the reform, as is found by Larsson and Runeson (2007). Regarding the 
job finding rate on the other hand, there is no indication that transitions to employment 
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  21 increased for the treated relative to the comparisons after the reform. When interpreting 
these figures it is important to note that they do not adjust for any of the potentially im-
portant differences between the two groups. Perhaps most importantly, they do not ac-
count for the lengths of the unemployment spells.
29 Separating the reform effect from 
the effect of unemployment duration is a crucial part of the identification strategy, 
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Figure 4 Share of the UI recipients reporting sick (per two-week interval), before and 
after the reform 
Note: The shares are computed as (number of UI recipients reporting sick within an interval)/(average number of UI 
recipients each week in that interval). The shares are computed for the individuals in the LINDA-database who began 
an unemployment period with income-related UI benefits during the period 2002-12-01 – 2003-12-31. 
                                                 
29 Not accounting for spell length means that the composition of the two groups with regard to unemployment 
duration will change over time in divergent ways, since the workers in the different groups leave unemployment at 
different rates. This may cause the difference between the hazard rate for the treated and the comparisons to change 
over time.  
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Figure 5 Share of the unemployed finding employment (per two-week interval), before 
and after the reform 
Note: The shares are computed as (number of unemployed persons finding a job within an interval)/(average number 
of unemployed persons each week in that interval). The shares are computed for the individuals in the LINDA-database 
who began an unemployment period with income-related UI benefits during the period 2002-12-01 – 2003-12-31. 
6 Empirical  results 
6.1  Transitions to sickness insurance 
For the reform in July 2003 to have an effect on the job finding rate among unemployed 
workers, it must first of all have an effect on sickness absence. I therefore begin by 
examining how the reform affected the incidence of sick reports among the UI 
recipients, that is, the transition rate from UI to SI benefits.  Hence, I replicate the 
results in Larsson and Runeson (2007), though with a somewhat different sample
30.
31, 32 
Table 3 presents results for Cox regression models as described in Section 4, but 
where the outcome variable is sick leave rather than employment. The table shows the 
                                                 
30 The most important difference is that I use weekly, rather than daily, data. 
31 Since I allow individuals to return to UI benefits after a sickness period, I here follow Larsson and Runeson (2007) 
and exclude UI spells starting after July 1, 2003. This is to avoid changes in the sample composition that are caused 
by the reform. If the reform also affects the duration of the SI spells, it may affect the composition of UI recipients 
through its effect on the hazard rate from SI back to UI.  
32 In this analysis, I do not impose the restriction that there must be a three-week break in the UI benefit payments for 
a spell to end. Instead, a sickness period of any length or an interruption in the UI benefit payments which is longer 
than one calendar week defines the end of a UI period.   
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  23 estimated reform effect for four different specifications, estimated with partial maxi-
mum likelihood
33. A table with all parameter estimates can be found in the Appendix. 
Column (1) shows the results for a model that only includes a dummy for the reform 
date, a dummy for treatment status, and an interaction variable called the ‘cap reform 
effect’. The latter captures the effect of the reduced SI benefit cap, and is thus the vari-
able of interest. In column (2) I present results for a model to which I have added indi-
cators for the month of entry into unemployment, the number of days left until the UI 
benefits expire, the local labor market, as well the following individual characteristics: 
sex, age, level of education (4 categories), type of education (10 categories), immigrant 
background, marital status, presence of children younger than 18 and pre-unem-
ployment wage. The last two columns show results for two stratified models, where the 
month of entry into unemployment and the local labor market are used as stratification 
units.
34 As mentioned in Section 4, these models should be less sensitive to compositio-
nal changes in unobserved factors as the reform effect is identified solely by comparing 
individuals beginning their unemployment period during the same month (column 3), as 
well as in the same local labor market (column 4). 
We first note that the coefficient for the reform date dummy is negative and sig-
nificant in all four specifications, indicating that there was a general decrease in 
sickness absence around the time of the reform. This variable should partially be 
picking up the effect of the general 3 percent reduction in SI benefits but also the effect 
of other changes around July 1, 2003, such as seasonal variation in sickness absence. 
The estimate for the ‘cap reform effect’ is also statistically significant in all speci-
fications and quite large; it suggests that the reduced SI benefit cap lowered the inci-
dence of sick reports among the treated with 31-33 percent
35. Moreover, this estimate is 
very stable across the various specifications. Hence, in line with Larsson and Runeson 
                                                 
33 Ties are handled using the exact method in SAS, see DeLong et al (1994), and Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980).  
34 These models are estimated with a stratified partial maximum likelihood estimator; see e.g. van den Berg (2001), 
section 6.  
35 The percentage effect is obtained by 100*(exp(β)-1), where β is the parameter of interest.  
24  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? (2007), these results suggest that the reform had a strong negative effect on the 
transition rate to SI among the UI recipients.
36 
Table 3 Estimated effects on the transition rate to sickness insurance 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post reform (t)   ) (
reform








Previous wage>20,696   ) (








Cap reform effect (t)    ) * (
T reform








      
Month of entry into unemployment  No  Yes  -  - 
No of days until UI-expiration, in the 
beginning of the spell (six categories) 
No Yes Yes Yes 
All other covariates included  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Stratification by month of entry  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Stratification by local labor market  No  No  No  Yes 
      
-2 Log likelihood  14,819  14,607  13,524  9,303 
No of observations  12,748 12,746 12,746 12,746 
No of strata  -  -  7  153 
Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable. The following 
covariates are included in column (2)-(4): sex, age, age
2, immigrant background, marital status, presence of children 
younger than 18, level of education, type of education, ln(pre-unemployment wage), and indicators for the local labor 
market.  
6.2  Transitions to employment 
Let us now move on to analyze whether the reduced sick report rate among the treated 
also translated into a higher rate of job finding. The results for the Cox regression 
models are reported in Table 4 . As in the previous section, I start by presenting results 
for a model that only includes a dummy for the reform date, a dummy for the treatment 
group and an interaction variable – the ‘cap reform effect’ – which captures the effect of 
the reduced SI benefit cap on the treated population (column 1). The point estimate for 
the cap reform effect is close to zero in this model and it is not statistically significant. 
Adding covariates to the model does not alter this finding; the estimate for the cap re-
form effect is close to zero and non-significant also in the second specification, which 
includes all covariates. A table with all parameter estimates can be found in the 
Appendix. 
                                                 
36 The size of the effect is very similar to the one found in Larsson and Runeson (2007). Their preferred estimate for 
the ‘cap reform effect’ implies a 36 percent reduction of the incidence of sick reports. This effect is very robust across 
various sensitivity tests. They also study the effect on sickness duration, but find no such effects.  
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  25 In the last two specifications, I have stratified on the month of inflow into un-
employment (column 3), as well as on the local labor market (column 4). This means 
that the baseline hazard is allowed to differ across months of entry, and across local 
labor markets. The variation which identifies the reform effect in these specifications 
thus comes from when, within a given month, a person entered unemployment. These 
models should be less sensitive to seasonal (column 3), as well as regional (column 4), 
variations in labor market conditions. A further implication of this approach is that only 
unemployment spells that start before the reform are used to identify the reform effect 
(since there is no within-month variation in the time-varying reform variable for spells 
beginning after the reform). While the estimate for the cap reform effect does not 
change much as I stratify on the entry month, it becomes more negative when I also 
stratify on the local labor market. However, it is still very far from being significantly 
different from zero. In sum, I find no evidence suggesting that the reduced sick report 
rate in the treatment group affected the transition rate to employment. 
Regarding the other variables, we note that the estimate for the post reform dummy is 
negative and significant in all four specifications. This result indicates a general 
decrease in transitions to employment around the time of the reform (as is suggested in 
Figure 5). We also note that the dummy for the treatment group is positive and 
significant, showing that the job finding rate in general is higher for the unemployed 
with previously high wages. 
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Table 4 Estimated effects on the transition rate to employment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Post reform (t)   ) (
reform
t D -0.156***   
(0.046) 
-0.300***   
(0.073) 
-0.739***   
(0.233) 
-0.617***   
(0.237) 
Previous wage>20,696   ) (
T D 0.422***   
(0.066) 
0.209***   
(0.076) 
0.197***   
(0.076) 
0.235***   
(0.078) 
Cap reform effect (t)    ) * (
T reform
t D D 0.007 
    (0.078) 
-0.007   
(0.079) 
0.000   
(0.079) 
-0.069   
(0.082) 
      
No of days until UI-expiration, in the 
beginning of the spell  (six categories) 
No Yes Yes Yes 
Month of entry into unemployment  No  Yes  -  - 
All other covariates included  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
      
Stratification by month of entry  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Stratification by local labor market  No  No  No  Yes 
      
-2 Log likelihood  39,382  38,670  35,964  25,669 
No of observations  14,935 14,932 14,932 14,932 
No of strata  -  -  11  239 
Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable. The following 
covariates are included in column (2)-(4): sex, age, age
2, immigrant background, marital status, presence of children 
younger than 18, level of education, type of education, ln(pre-unemployment wage), and indicators for the local labor 
market. 
 
Even in the absence of a significant average treatment effect, there may be an effect 
on the job finding rate for sub-groups of unemployed workers. Previous studies on 
sickness absence among the unemployed, find that the flow to SI increases as the UI 
expiration date approaches (see e.g. Larsson 2006). A similar pattern is visible in my 
results, see Table A1 in the Appendix. Moreover, Larsson and Runeson (2007) find that 
the decline in sick reports due to the July 2003-reform was largest among those with 
relatively few UI days left. To check whether there perhaps is an effect on the job 
finding rate for those who are close to benefit expiration, I have re-estimated the model 
only including the sub-sample with less than 150 remaining UI days (in the beginning 
of their unemployment period). However, the estimate for the cap reform effect is insig-
nificant also for this group. 
6.3 Sensitivity  analyses 
The treatment and comparison group are indeed heterogeneous in several respects as 
treatment status is defined based on pre-unemployment earnings. One concern is whe-
ther the estimate of the cap reform effect is biased due to divergent trends in labor 
market opportunities for the two groups. For instance, if the labor market opportunities 
IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment?  27 worsened for the high-wage relative to the low-wage unemployed during the time 
period studied, this may bias the estimate of the cap reform effect downwards. This 
could then explain why we do not observe any effect of the cap reform on the transition 
rate to employment. A similar problem may arise if the labor market opportunities 
worsened more for the high-wage than for the low-wage unemployed around July 2003, 
due to different seasonal patterns. I perform several sensitivity analyses in order to test 
the robustness of my results in these respects. 
I start by examining employment-to-population rates for different educational groups 
during the relevant period (2002-2004), see Figure 6. Since the average level of 
education is higher among the treated, this figure should give an indication of how the 
labor market opportunities developed for the two groups during this time period. Figure 
6 gives no support for that these opportunities worsened for the treated relative to the 
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Figure 6 Employment-to-population rates for different educational groups, 2001-2004 
(annual averages) 
Note: Calculated for persons aged 16-64. Source: Labour Force Surveys, Statistics Sweden. 
 
The employment-to-population rates are only available as annual averages. As 
discussed above, the result could also be biased due to divergent seasonal patterns in 
labor market opportunities for workers with different wages. In order to examine this 
possibility, I first re-estimate the model for different sub-samples which are more 
28  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? similar than the treated and comparisons in the baseline model, in terms of the pre-
unemployment wage. I also test whether there could be different seasonal patterns for 
the two groups around the time of the reform, by analyzing the effects of a hypothetical 
reform supposed to have occurred on the same date the year after the actual reform.
37 
To reduce heterogeneity between the two groups, I successively exclude individuals 
with the 10 percent, 30 percent, 50 percent and 70 percent lowest pre-unemployment 
wages in the comparison group.
38 Column (2)-(5) in Table 5 present the results from 
this exercise. For ease of comparison, the first column of the table reproduces my main 
results (shown in column 2, Table 4). The point estimate for the cap reform effect re-
mains close to zero in all these regressions and the estimate is far from being sta-
tistically significant. Hence, limiting heterogeneity between the two groups in this way 
does not affect my findings. 
Table 5 Effects of excluding workers with the lowest previous wages  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
% of comparison group excluded  0%  10%  30%  50%  70% 
Average previous wage (month)           
    Comparison group  15,968 16,680 17,573 18,340 19,149 
    Treatment group  25 552  25 552  25 552  25 552  25 552 
Post reform (t)   ) (
reform
t D -0.300***   
(0.073) 
-0.320***   
(0.075) 
-0.334***   
(0.082) 
-0.398***   
(0.092) 
-0.396***   
(0.109) 
Previous wage>20,696   ) (
T D 0.209***   
(0.076) 
0.224***   
(0.080) 
0.261***   
(0.083) 
0.265***   
(0.085) 
0.251***   
(0.091) 
Cap reform effect (t)   ) * (
T ref
t D D -0.007   
(0.079) 
-0.003   
(0.080) 
-0.006   
(0.083) 
0.008   
(0.087) 
0.000   
(0.097) 
       
All covariates included  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
       
-2 Log likelihood  38,670  36,727 32,145 27,186 21,353 
No of observations  14,932 13,777 11,462  9,151  6,838 
Note: Estimation with partial maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at 
the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable. The following covariates are included: sex, 
age, age
2, immigrant background, marital status, presence of children younger than 18, level of education, type of 
education, ln(pre-unemployment wage), number of days until UI-expiration, indicators for the month of entry into un-
employment and the local labor market. 
 
                                                 
37 Due to lack of data on pre-unemployment wages for 2002, I cannot perform the same analysis for the year before 
the reform.  
38 Ideally, we may also want to exclude individuals with the highest previous wages among the treated. However, by 
doing this we would at the same time reduce the average amount of ‘treatment’ received in the treatment group. 
Recall that the percentage decrease in SI benefits varied among the treated depending on the pre-unemployment 
wage; the higher the wage, the larger the percentage reduction in benefits. The results from such an exercise would 
thus be difficult to interpret.  
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a new sample of unemployment spells, following the same sampling procedure but 
instead including spells beginning during the period 1 December 2003 – 30 December 
2004. In case this imaginary reform gives rise to a significant estimate for the ‘cap re-
form effect’, this would indicate that the seasonal patterns may indeed differ for the two 
groups around this time of the year. If there is no significant ’effect’ of the hypothetical 
reform either, divergent seasonal patterns in labor market opportunities seems less 
likely to be a problem. The results for this exercise are shown in Table 6, column (2). 
The first column of the table reproduces my main results for the actual reform (shown in 
column 2, Table 4). The estimate for the hypothetical cap reform is more negative than 
the estimate for the actual reform, however it is far from being significantly different 
from zero. Hence, there is no evidence of different seasonal patterns for the two groups 
around July 1 the year after the reform. 
Table 6 Estimated effects of a hypothetical reform July 1, 2004 
 (1) 
Actual reform 
(July 1, 2003) 
(2) 
Hypothetical reform 
(July 1, 2004) 
Post reform (t)   ) (
reform




Previous wage>20,696   ) (




Cap reform effect (t)    ) * (
T reform




    
No of days until UI-expiration (six cat.)  Yes  Yes 
Month of entry into unemployment  Yes  Yes 
All other covariates included  Yes  Yes 
    
-2 Log likelihood  38,670  40,136 
No of observations  14,932  16,160 
Note: Estimation with partial maximum likelihood. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** denotes significance at 
the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable. The following covariates are included: sex, 
age, age
2, immigrant background, marital status, presence of children younger than 18, level of education, type of 
education, ln(pre-unemployment wage), and indicators for local labor market. 
 
In addition to the sensitivity analyses presented above, I have checked whether the 
results are sensitive to how unemployment spells that end for ‘unknown reasons’ (which 
may well be employment) are treated. To do this, I have re-estimated the model treating 
these spell as ending in employment. I have also estimated a model that account for 
(persistent) unobserved individual heterogeneity, by using the fact that I have multiple 
30  IFAU – Do interactions between UI and SI affect transitions to employment? unemployment spells for a part of the sample.
39 The findings are qualitatively the same 
in these models. 
7 Concluding  remarks 
This paper studies the effects of a reform which substantially reduced the economic 
incentives for unemployed persons to transfer from the unemployment insurance (UI) to 
the sickness insurance (SI). While there is evidence that this reform effectively lowered 
the incidence of sick reports among the unemployed affected, I find no evidence 
suggesting that the reduced sick report rate in turn affected the transition rate to 
employment. Hence, for those who reduced their sick report rate due to the reform, 
spending more time in the UI rather than the SI did not seem to shorten the time out of 
employment. 
Should we then conclude that the interplay between these two insurances does not 
have any economic significance, and that it does not matter whether there perhaps is 
excess use of the SI among the unemployed? Probably not. First of all, making sure that 
the insurance systems are used in the way intended is likely to be important per se. If 
the citizens have the perception that the benefits are misused this could undermine the 
legitimacy for the social insurance system. Second, we should note that the study in this 
paper is a partial equilibrium analysis, and that the results do not indicate how the 
reform affected total employment. Reduced SI benefits for the unemployed may affect 
employment through other channels than the one studied here, e.g. it may affect transi-
tions to other benefit systems as they become relatively more attractive. Early retire-
ment pension is one example. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, the fact that I do not find any effect on the job 
finding rate can have two different explanations, which in turn will have very different 
                                                 
39 To check whether the results are affected by compositional changes in unobserved factors, I have estimated a 
model where I stratify on the individual. That is, the reform effect is identified using within individual variation. This 
method may not be ideal since it only uses a small sub-sample of the unemployed workers (only 24 percent of the 
individuals in the sample have repeated unemployment spells), as well as rests on the assumption that the unobserved 
individual characteristics are fixed across spells. However, the results are qualitatively the same. These results are not 
reported, but are available upon request from the author. 
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search effort did not differ depending on receiving benefits from the UI or the SI (given 
their health status). This would then indicate that monitoring in at least one of the 
insurance systems is insufficient. If these unemployed persons did not search actively in 
either system, this would suggest insufficient monitoring in the UI, as active search is a 
formal requirement for receiving UI benefits. If they in fact searched actively in both 
systems, this would instead indicate insufficient monitoring in the SI, as the SI is 
intended for those who have lost their work (search) capacity due to sickness. 
Second, it is possible that spending more time in the UI in fact did increase search 
effort, but that more active search still did not result in faster transitions to employment 
for this particular group. If this is the case, it would indicate that those who changed 
their sickness absence behavior due to the reform belong to a group with weak attach-
ment to the labor market. An interesting topic for future research would be to use data 
on individual search behavior in order to discriminate between these two explanations. 
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Table A1 Estimated effects on the transition rate to sickness insurance 
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Post reform (t)   ) (
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Cap reform effect (t)    ) * (
T reform








      
Days until UI benefit expiration
 
(Ref: 50-1 days until UI-expiration) 
    






























      











































Level of education: 
(Ref: compulsory school) 
    
      Upper secondary education    -0.176 

















Type of education (10 categories)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 






Month of entry into unemployment  No  Yes  -  - 
Dummies for local labor market (county)  No  Yes  Yes  - 
      
Stratification by month of entry  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Stratification by local labor market  No  No  No  Yes 
      
-2 Log likelihood  14,819 14,607 13,524  9,303 
No of observations  12,748  12,746  12,746  12,746 
No of strata  -  -  7  153 
Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable.Measured in the 
beginning of the unemployment spell. 
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  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Days until UI benefit expiration
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(Ref: 50-1 days until UI-expiration) 
    
























100-51 days until UI-exp.    0.002 
(0.090) 
-0.007   
(0.090) 
-0.003   
(0.091) 
      











































Level of education: 
(Ref: compulsory school) 
    


















Type of education (10 categories)  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 






Month of entry into unemployment  No  Yes  -  - 
Dummies for local labor market (county)  No  Yes  Yes  - 
      
Stratification by month of entry  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Stratification by local labor market  No  No  No  Yes 
      
-2 Log likelihood  39,382  38,670  35,964  25,669 
No of observations  14,935  14,932  14,932  14,932 
No of strata  -  -  11  239 
Note: Estimation using (stratified) partial maximum likelihood estimator. Standard errors in parentheses. */**/*** 
denotes significance at the 10/5/1 percent levels respectively. (t) denotes time-varying variable.
Measured in the 
beginning of the unemployment spell. 
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